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ivAbstract
Cameroon is a small open economy that relies on the export of a few primary products 
for its foreign exchange earnings. The low rate of savings cannot meet the investment 
requirements, and investment has been declining despite many years of economic 
reform. There is consequently a resource gap that has to be filled by both official and 
private resource inflows, but these resource inflows have similarly been declining. They 
have also become highly volatile, thus undermining their positive effects on capital 
formation and consequently on economic growth and poverty reduction. This study 
examined the effect of resource inflows and their volatility on domestic investment 
in Cameroon. 
  The results show that inflow volatility is high and that export revenue volatility 
is the prime mover of aggregate volatility. There is no evidence of inflow volatilities 
reinforcing or offsetting each other. Aggregate resource flow is important for both 
public and private domestic investment, while its volatility is detrimental. When total 
resource flows is disaggregated into export revenue, official flows, foreign direct 
investment and “other private flows”, only export revenue and “other private flows” 
significantly affect private investment, indicating that the impact on investment varies 
depending on the type of inflow. The volatility of official flows and export revenue 
hurts investment directly, but also negates the influence of the other inflows on both 
private and public investment. 
  The study suggests that government make more efforts to attract more resource 
flows into the country and, especially, to reduce their volatility. Diversifying export 
supplies to minimize price fluctuations, complying with aid conditionalities (this 
should be facilitated with the country ownership of the poverty reduction strategy), 
developing a robust and transparent financial sector and stock exchange, and avoiding 
frequent and unpredictable policy shifts are among the actions that can go a long way 
to reduce resource flow volatility. Domestic investment, and consequently growth and 
poverty reduction, should be the main beneficiaries.
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1.  Introduction
After almost a decade and half of reforms under the auspices of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, economic growth in Cameroon is still far below expectations. The 
encouraging growth of the late 1990s failed to reach the level necessary to have a 
significant impact on poverty. On a per capita basis, growth has been modest indeed: In 
2000, for example, real GDP growth rate stood at 4.15%, while the population growth 
rate was 2.82%. This is not sufficient to meet the Millennium Development Goal 
target of attaining and sustaining the average real GDP growth rate of 7% per annum 
required to halve poverty by 2015 (UNECA, 1999: 5). Compared to the Southeast 
Asian average growth rate of 6.7% per annum between 1990 and 1997 (Mlambo and 
Oshikoya, 2001), growth performance in Cameroon has a long way to go. 
A number of empirical studies (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Khan and Reinhart, 
1990) have identified investment as one of the essential components or requirements 
of GDP growth on the African continent. In Cameroon private investment has been 
shown to have a “large, statistically significant, and robust” effect on economic growth 
Ghura (1997, P.27). This explains why the structural adjustment programme adopted 
in 1988, privileged the creation of an appropriate incentive structure for private sector 
investment. The aim was to stimulate domestic investment and to attract foreign 
investment. 
Gross fixed capital formation in Cameroon has actually declined steadily over the 
years, falling from 25% of GDP in the early 1980s to 14.30% in 1992 and 16.45% in 
2000. The trend of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Cameroon has not been much 
different. FDI declined from a peak of US$290 million in 1989 to only US$110 million 
in 2000. Even the 1994 devaluation had only a timid impact on capital formation. 
UNECA (2001: 7) reports a similar trend for Africa, whose  FDI share decreased 
from 2.0% to 1.3% of global FDI between 1997 and 1998. As a share of FDI to the 
developing world, sub-Saharan Africa received only 4.3% in 1999, down from 10.5% 
in the 19811989 period (Ndikumana, 2003). 
The low rate of domestic savings has been identified in the literature as one of the 
constraints to capital formation in developing countries. In Cameroon the savings gap Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n  2
(the difference between investment and savings) has been high as shown in Figure 1. It 
peaked at 22.14% of GDP in 1978, though on average it was 9.46% of GDP between 
1970 and 2000. The drastic drop in the gap after 1979 is a result of the high domestic 
saving accruing from the oil boom. This fall in the savings gap had a positive effect on 
both public and private capital formation starting from the early 1980s. The subsequent 
reduction in the gap after 1986 was due to the rapid fall in investment resulting from 
the economic crisis. Both public and private capital formation fell drastically during 
this period (Figure 1). The existence of a savings gap throughout the study period 
indicates how Cameroon has relied on foreign resource flows to realize its investment 
requirements. Such resources come to supplement domestic savings and relieve the 
liquidity constraint. They have therefore been identified as one of the factors favouring 
domestic investment and growth in developing countries. 
Figure 1: Savings gap and fixed capital formation in Cameroon, 1970-2000 (% 
of GDP)
The low level of domestic savings is likely to remain so, mainly because of low 
incomes, as well as weak institutional capacity. Equally, the capacity to generate 
larger volumes of foreign exchange from exports is likely to remain low for as long as 
Cameroon remains dependent on the export of a few primary commodities. This implies 
that Cameroon will still have to rely on resource inflows (both official and private) 
to finance its development. Other things being equal, these resources are expected to 
close the resource gap, and thus stimulate investment and economic growth. 
According to the UNECA (2001) and the World Bank (2001b), if the 7% average 
annual growth rate needed to reach the MDG target of reducing poverty by half by 
2015 is to be met, domestic investment will have to be increased by 50% and aid by 
20%. But net official flows to Cameroon have been falling since 1995 to reach just 
4.22% of GDP in 2000. Net private flows were 5% of GDP in 1990 and remained 
negative for most of the 1990s. Given Cameroon’s low saving rates, it is important to 
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The main issue here is not only that the quantity of resource flows into Cameroon has 
been declining but also that such resource inflows have become increasingly volatile. 
The literature raises questions about the volatility of resource flows to developing 
countries and how this can affect economic performance. The volatility of official flows 
affects fiscal behaviour, for example, and lowers both public and private investment 
according to Lensink and Morrissey (1999). Aid flows are equally reported to be more 
volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and thus pose challenges for short-term fiscal 
management (Bulíø and Hamann, 2001; Gemmell and McGillivray, 1998). Private 
capital flows are also known to be volatile, especially portfolio flows and other short-
term debts as was the case during the Asian crisis (Loungani and Razin, 2001). This 
feature of resource inflows can indirectly offset some of their beneficial effects on 
both investment and growth. It is therefore important not only to examine the effect of 
resource inflows on investment, but also how the volatility of such resources impacts 
on public and private investment. 
For Cameroon, the aggregate resource inflow volatility index (including export 
revenue) was above 3.5 (for the two methods we use to compute the index in this paper 
as shown below). We could not obtain aggregate volatility indexes in the literature to 
compare our results, but we disaggregate our inflow variables and calculate the volatility 
of official flows for which we could find some comparable indexes in the literature. 
Our index for official flow volatility is 1.20 (an average of our two indexes). Gemmel 
and McGillivray (1998) had 0.99 for developing countries (between 1976 and 1994), 
while Collier (1999) had 0.35 for 39 African countries (19701995). A comparison1 of 
these indexes reveals that aid flows to Cameroon are more volatile than the average 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, and also that for developing countries. 
As we show later in the paper, official flow volatility in Cameroon is high, but much 
lower than that of export revenue. Aggregate resource inflow volatility is expected to 
have a negative impact on the economy. Figure 2 shows how aggregate inflow volatility 
has evolved with both public and domestic private fixed capital formation. Total inflow 
volatility was high in the second economic phase (19781986), and it was during this 
period that domestic private capital formation started its downward trend. Public capital 
formation also started declining after only a few years. That was the beginning of the 
economic crisis. A more systematic relationship is established between volatility and 
fixed capital formation by the econometric analysis.Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n  4
Figure 2: Volatility of resource flows and fixed capital formation in Cameroon, 
1970-2000 (% of GDP)
This paper thus attempts to investigate whether resource inflows, and especially 
resource inflow volatility, have any significant effect on domestic investment2 (both 
public and private) in Cameroon. First, we break down inflows into official, private 
(FDI and others) and export revenue in order to see how differently they affect 
domestic investment. Second, we examine how some inflow components can reduce 
or exacerbate the impact of inflow volatility on domestic investment. Finally, we try 
to see whether the various inflow volatilities offset or reinforce each other, and how 
they each contribute to total inflow volatility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 compiles some stylized 
facts on the evolution of capital formation (both public and private), the various 
components of resource flows and real GDP during the various economic phases 
identified. Section 3 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature, and Section 4 
presents the theoretical framework and the specification of the estimable model. The 
method of estimation is examined in Section 5, which also defines the variables and 
provides the source of the data used. Section 6 summarizes the empirical results, while 
Section 7 draws conclusions and makes some recommendations meant to improve the 


















In this section, we divide the recent economic history of Cameroon into four subperiods 
starting from 1970. The division is a function of major economic events witnessed 
by the country or some major economic policy changes made by the government and 
how both investment and resource inflows evolved. 
The pre-oil era (19701977) 
D
uring this subperiod, the primary sector  especially agriculture  was the   
mainstay of the economy. It was the principal source of economic growth,   
employment and foreign exchange earnings for the economy through the export 
of primary crops like cocoa, coffee and cotton. Average annual export revenue for the 
period was 132.72 billion CFA francs, representing 26.76% of GDP. Net official capital 
flows were an average of 5.35% of GDP, while net private flows represented 3.87% 
(FDI being only 0.56%). The need for resource flows was quite high at this time, as the 
savings-investment gap was really important. It peaked at 22.14% in 1978, although 
the annual average for this period was 9.14% of GDP. Real GDP grew at an average 
of 4.42% per year during this period, due essentially to the agricultural sector. (Refer 
to Table 1 for the details.)
2.  Resource inflows and investment in 
Cameroon: 1970-2000 Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n  6
As far as capital formation was concerned, the government’s share as a ratio of GDP 
was low as it averaged just 2.41% per year for the period. The domestic private sector 
was higher and stood at 15.01% of GDP a year. Public fixed capital formation was less 
than 13% of total fixed capital formation during this subperiod. This was a continuation 
of the colonial economic policy where government investment was concentrated on 
basic infrastructure like road and rail transport. 
The oil boom era (1978-1986) 
A
s oil became the main source of foreign exchange the economy witnessed an   
important shift. The share of the secondary sector (including mining) rose   
from 19% in the previous period to 28%. Real GDP rose rapidly at an average 
annual rate of 8.3%  the highest throughout the study period.3 The contribution of 
the oil sector to government revenue moved from 9% in 1980 to 41% in 1985. Total 
export revenue increased more than threefold to an average of CFAF730.49 billion. 
The share of export revenue in GDP consequently increased to 31.50%. In relation to 
the previous period, net official flows more than tripled to 80.04. FDI also increased 
substantially, but other private flows were on the decline (-1.93% of GDP) against 
5.39% in the previous period. 
With resources from the oil sector and other inflows, the government increased its 
capital expenditure. Public enterprises like railway, urban transport, air transport and 
shipping were created and regularly supported with government subsidies. Government 
investment was not limited to physical infrastructure, but also to the manufacturing 
sector of the economy, especially in agro-industrial complexes like SOCAPALM 
(production of palm oil), CAMSUCO (sugar), CDC (palm oil, rubber and tea) and 
others. In fact, Cameroon had opted for the import-substitution industrialization 
strategy, whereby a strong industrial base was seen as the only means of spurring the 
other sectors of the economy and achieving economic progress. Public investment 7 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
consequently rose sharply during this period. The public investmentGDP ratio stood 
at 6.12% annually, up from 2.41% for the previous period (almost tripling). It ended 
the period at about 10.50% of GDP. Domestic private capital formation did not benefit 
as much from the oil boom. The yearly average increased, however, to 16.10% of 
GDP within the subperiod, up from 15.01%. It was in this subperiod that domestic 
private capital formation reached its peak of 18.08% in 1981, and it was also during 
this subperiod that it started its long downward trend. Notwithstanding, about 73% of 
all capital formation in the country during these years was carried out by the private 
sector. 
The era of economic crisis (1987-1993) 
C
ontinuous decline in the prices of Cameroon’s primary export 
commodities4 , especially crude oil, cocoa and coffee characterized 
this period. The immediate consequence was a fall in export 
earnings. The ratio of export revenue to GDP dropped to 18.71, down from 
31.50 in the previous period. Real GDP growth took a downward trend and 
was negative throughout the period, with an annual average of  -3.99%. 
Economic activity shrank in most areas, especially in construction and public 
works, but also in the production of cash crops like coffee and cocoa. The 
real effective exchange rate is also reported to have grossly appreciated 
during this period by some 40% (Ghura, 1997) owing especially to the 
appreciation of the French Franc. The fiscal balance, which was positive 
during the previous period, became negative and averaged more than 6% of 
GDP. 
The deficit was financed from external borrowings. Net official flows more 
than doubled to CFAF160.89 billion compared to the previous period. This was a 
consequence of the structural adjustment reforms Cameroon agreed to with the Bretton 
Woods institutions. On adoption of these measures, Cameroon signed the first standby 
accord with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1988 worth SDR 62 million. 
This was followed by a rescheduling of debt by the Paris Club and the first structural 
adjustment lending (SAL) from the World Bank worth US$150 million in 1989 (World 
Bank, 2001a). The debt stock rose rapidly as Cameroon accumulated both domestic and 
external arrears. Unlike the official capital flows, the gloomy economic environment 
had a serious negative impact on private capital flows. FDI declined but remained 
positive, while “other private capital flows” were more seriously affected. Their average 
for the period was negative (-2.28% of GDP). In fact, net private capital flows were 
negative for most of the period, meaning that more private capital was going out of 
the country than was flowing in. This phenomenon of capital flight has been reported 
in several sub-Saharan African countries, and Ajayi (2000) observes that among other 
effects, it reduces the rate of capital accumulation. 
Capital formation suffered from the economic crisis as well. The huge official 
inflows did not prevent the public investmentGDP ratio from plummeting to an annual Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n  8
average of 5.81%. The ratio started the period (1987) at 11.04% and ended (1993) at 
1.82%. The adjustment programme actually discouraged the state from engaging in 
any productive activity. Domestic private capital formation was similarly strongly hit 
by the crisis. Its ratio with respect to GDP declined to an annual average of 11.22%, 
but fell below 10% in some years, down from more than 18% in 1981, a situation that 
accounts for the massive outflow of capital (net outflow of more than CFAF30 billion 
annually) The morose economic environment created uncertainty not only among 
foreign investors, but also among local investors who preferred to keep their resources 
more securely out of the country. 
The post-devaluation era (1994-2000) 
G
iven the magnitude of the macroeconomic imbalances, it became clear by the   
end of 1993 that internal adjustment alone had not been sufficient to put the   
economy back on its rails. The adjustment had failed to restore external 
competitiveness, as nominal domestic prices showed considerable downward rigidity. 
Similar circumstances prevailed throughout the CFAF zone, and to remedy the situation, 
the CFAF  which was pegged to the French Franc in 1948  was reluctantly devalued by 
50% in January 1994. Devaluation was seen as the last attempt to bring the economy out 
of the crisis, as it was believed that the real exchange rate was highly over-valued. 
Important financial assistance accompanied reforms recommended by the 
international donor community. Net official flows5 almost doubled to CFAF 311.12 
billion in 19942000 (6.89% of GDP), up from 4.78% for the previous period. The 
resources were meant to encourage the reform process and reduce the pains of 
adjustment. Devaluation had a similar positive effect on FDI, but other private capital 
flows remained sceptical of the economic environment, which was still not attractive 
enough to prevent capital flight and attract more private capital. The GDP responded 
positively and the export sector recorded strong gains as the devaluation improved the 
competitive position of the country. Real GDP growth turned round from an average 
decline of 3.99% during 19871993 to an average growth of 3.50% during 19942000. 
Export revenue jumped to CFAF1.3 trillion, a more than 100% increase from the 
preceding period. As a ratio of GDP, export growth was less spectacular, from 18.71% 
in the previous period to 26.33%. 
Private domestic capital formation reacted positively to the incentive structure 
provided. In absolute terms, it increased to an annual average of CFAF648.02 billion, 
up from CFAF387.64 billion in the previous period. As a percentage of GDP, the 
response was not that vigorous, as it went from 11.22% to 13.42%. Private investors 
remained hesitant, as evidenced by the continuous private capital outflows. Public 
capital formation continued its downward trend, averaging only 1.39% of GDP against 
5.81% for the previous period, and actually decreased from an average of CFAF208 
billion to only CFAF68.31 billion. This can be partly explained by the downsizing of 
the public sector recommended in the structural adjustment package. The role of the 
government was now limited to creating a conducive environment for private sector 
investment. But a public investmentGDP ratio of less than 1.5% appears to be too low 
to create an appropriate incentive structure to attract private investment, especially 9 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
FDI. The dilapidated road infrastructure in the country is testimony of low government 
investment. 
Overall, one fact that stands out very clearly is that in Cameroon, capital formation 
has essentially been carried out by the private sector even though recent performance 
has not been encouraging. More than 76% of all domestic capital formation between 
1970 and 2000 has been private. The oil boom and the import-substitution policy 
notwithstanding, public capital formation never attained 50% of all capital formation. 
This is in contrast to a country like Nigeria, for example, where in 1976, public capital 
formation was three times that of the private sector (Busari and Fashanu, 1998). 
Cameroon depends increasingly on official capital flows, and to a lesser extent on 
FDI flows. The performance of the other private capital flows has been disappointing. 
Indeed, for 11 consecutive years (1989 to 1999), net other private capital flows were 
negative.  Cameroon’s problem is therefore not limited only to attracting foreign 
capital, but also to preventing massive capital flight. The evolution of official and 
private capital flows (FDI and others), and export revenue is presented in Figure A1 
of the Appendix. 10
Resource inflows and investment: A review of 
the theoretical literature
M
uch is in the literature on the impact of various forms of resource inflows on   
the economic performance of the recipient economy. A majority of the studies   
examine the impact of inflows on growth, but more recently, the effect on 
poverty reduction has also become a subject of interest. Most of the studies acknowledge 
that inflows affect growth through their impact on investment (Gomanee et al., 2002; 
Lensink and Morrissey, 1999; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Stordel, 1990). Resource inflows 
affect domestic investment differently depending on the type of inflows. In this paper, 
we examine how official flows, private flows and export earnings  and their volatility   
are expected to affect domestic investment. 
According to Bulíø and Lane (2002) and Gomanee et al. (2002), poor countries lack 
sufficient resources to finance investment and import capital goods and technology. 
Aid to finance investment can directly fill the savings investment gap and,  because it 
is in the form of hard currency, can fill the foreign exchange gap. As official flows are 
issued to government, they can also fund government spending and compensate for 
a small domestic tax base. On the other hand, shortfalls in official flows (unexpected 
and signs of instability) are most likely to be followed by a reduction in government 
spending, and sometimes by an increase in taxes, or both. Bulíø and Hamann (2001) 
argue that a typical aid-receiving country that is unable to offset an unexpected non-
disbursement of aid by borrowing, may resort to costly, and possibly inefficient, swift 
fiscal adjustments. Incomplete adjustment to the shortfall in aid is likely to crowd 
out private investment and/or create inflationary pressures. According to Bulíø and 
Lane (2002), conditionality is a major source of aid volatility. This not only applies 
to the conditions attached by bilateral donors, but frequently, the requirement that aid 
recipients have the seal of approval of an on-track IMF-supported programme. Pallage 
and Robe (2001) add that highly volatile aid is obviously less beneficial to recipient 
countries than a similar mean level of aid delivered in a less volatile form. 
3.  Literature review11 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
Feldstein (1994) and the World Bank (2001b) argue that the relationship between 
private capital inflows and investment is complex and ambiguous. Access to foreign 
capital can allow one firm to increase investment, but that firm’s expansion may 
induce another to reduce investment or shut down completely. The composition of 
capital flow is important in determining the relationship between private capital flows 
and investment. FDI (which is less volatile) is expected to have a greater impact on 
investment and growth as it contributes to the spread of best practices in corporate 
governance and allows transfer of technology. It equally limits the ability of the 
local government to pursue bad policies that might hurt even domestic investors. 
On the other hand, portfolio flows and other private flows are driven by speculative 
considerations and are often very volatile. They are subject to reversals at the first 
sign of trouble, and consequently may not influence domestic investment (Loungani 
and Razin, 2001). The World Bank (2001b) adds that the relationship between private 
capital flows and investment may equally depend on the absorptive capacity of the 
domestic economy, which includes not just the macroeconomic policy framework but 
also political stability, the health of the financial system, the educational attainment 
of the work force, the quality of physical infrastructure, the efficiency of government 
services, and the degree of corruption.  
Lensink and Morrissey (2001) argue that the volatility of private capital flows might 
be a reflection of underlying economic or political uncertainty in the economy, with 
its negative impact on investment and growth. The literature also notes that although 
FDI is less volatile than other private flows, it is possible that sudden changes in the 
volume of FDI inflows can have a destabilizing impact on the economy (Klein et al., 
2001). 
As far as export earnings instability is concerned, it is believed to increase uncertainty 
and reduce business confidence. According to Ghirmay et al. (1999) and Love (1989), 
export instability results in income instability, which makes estimation of expected 
returns on investment difficult, generating risks and uncertainty for entrepreneurs. In 
addition, government revenue is often directly linked to export revenue, implying that 
instability in the latter will lead to instability in the former and thus reduced public 
investment. Export instability may also affect investment through its impact on imports. 
This argument stresses the binding nature of the foreign exchange constraint facing 
many developing countries. It is widely accepted that growth in developing countries 
requires modern technological inputs often embodied in imported capital goods, as 
these countries lack any substantial domestic industrial and capital goods capacity. 
Resource inflows and investment: A review of 
the empirical literature
E
mpirical studies have examined the relationship between investment and inflows,   
including aid, private inflows and export revenue. One strand of studies has   
looked at the relationship between aid and investment. Lensink and Morrissey 
(1999), Hansen and Tarp (2000), Dollar and Easterly (1999) and Feyzioglu et al. 
(1996) all find a positive relationship between aid and domestic investment. Dollar Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n   12
and Easterly add that this relationship is only significant in a good policy environment. 
Feyzioglu et al. (1996) conclude that a dollar given in aid to developing countries causes 
government spending to increase by a dollar. Of this, roughly one-quarter is spent on 
capital expenditure. Nyoni (1997) reports that booms in aid inflows were marked by 
record highs in domestic investment in Tanzania. On aid volatility, the World Bank 
(2001b) affirms that aid works principally by increasing domestic investment, but 
that volatility in aid flows dampens domestic investment. Bulíø and Lane (2002) and 
Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) show that aid is significantly more volatile than 
domestic fiscal revenues and thus poses challenges for short-term fiscal management. 
Lensink and Morrissey (1999) find that volatility of aid receipts affects fiscal behaviour 
and lowers both public and private investment. 
A similarly wide range of empirical studies has examined the relationship between 
private capital flows and investment. These studies generally find a positive relationship 
between capital inflows and investment. Mishra et al. (2001) conclude from their 
analysis that a 1% increase in capital inflows to Africa boosts investment by more 
than 1%. The type of capital flow is important, however. Long-term capital flows 
(World Bank, 2001b) are strongly and positively related to domestic investment, while 
short-term flows have little or no such relationship. Further, whereas certain types of 
long-term flows, such as FDI, are clearly associated with increases in investment, the 
relationship between portfolio flows and investment, although typically positive, has 
been less robust. Feldstein (1994) finds that a dollar of capital inflows or outflows tends 
to be associated, respectively, with a one-dollar rise or fall in domestic investment. 
Lensink and Morrissey (2001) show that while FDI positively affects growth, FDI 
volatility has a consistent negative impact on growth. 
The empirical literature on export earnings instability and investment is scanty. 
Much is written on the effect of export earnings instability on economic growth, 
although still maintaining that investment provides the link between the two (Stordel, 
1990; Dawe, 1996). Other export instability and growth studies that find a negative 
relationship include Sinha (1999) and Gyimah-Brempong (1991). Among the studies 
that specifically examine the relationship between export earnings instability and 
capital formation are those of Dawe (1996), Stordel (1990) and Love (1989). Stordel, 
for example, estimates separate equations for each of the 12 developing countries 
selected, as he argues that investment behaviour is likely to vary slightly because 
of structural differences among the countries. His results show that fluctuations in 
export earnings negatively affect investment in 7 of the 12 countries in the sample. 
The relationship is particularly significant for those countries characterized by a small 




o the best of our knowledge, only a few studies have been published on the   
determinants of investment in Cameroon despite its recognized impact on   
economic growth. Some of these papers are: Mbanga and Sikod (2001), Zeufack 
(1997) and Fielding (1995). 13 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
Zeufack (1997) uses firm-level data to examine the effect of high demand uncertainty 
on the investment behaviour of local and foreign private firms in Cameroon. He uses a 
panel of 68 manufacturing firms from the period 1988/89 to 1991/92 representing 16% 
of the firms in the sector. The sample is divided into 36 local and 32 foreign private 
enterprises. He uses a fixed effect double-within investment model. The anticipated 
effective production level of the firm is used to measure demand uncertainty. The results 
show that demand uncertainty negatively affects investment, and that this is linked 
to the ownership structure of the firm. Foreign private investors are more sensitive to 
demand uncertainty than their domestic counterparts. The other significant determinants 
of private investment are profitability and lagged capital stock. The similarity between 
Zeufack’s paper and ours is that he shows the impact of demand uncertainty on the 
investment behaviour of local and foreign entrepreneurs. But while  he focuses on 
the effect of demand uncertainty on firms (micro-level), we are looking at uncertainty 
resulting from variability of foreign resource flows at the macroeconomic level. We do 
expect to have similar results, however  a negative relationship between uncertainty 
resulting from inflow volatility and domestic capital formation. 
Fielding (1995) sets out to verify the assertion by Devarajan and de Melo (1987) 
that the saving of Cameroon oil revenue in American banks was a wise decision as it 
kept the stock of credit to the economy low, thus avoiding a spending boom and an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (Dutch disease). He uses a financial repression 
investment model applying cointegration analysis. After showing that investment 
significantly depends on bank credits, he goes further to calculate the real rate of 
returns for keeping oil revenue out of the country and making it available at home 
for domestic credit. The real rates of return are 23% and 36%, respectively. Thus his 
conclusion that directing the oil revenue towards domestic investment would probably 
have been a better policy than using it to buy foreign assets. Fielding limits his study 
to the inflow of oil revenue. The effect of the inflow of oil revenue might not even be 
felt if this is more than compensated by the inflow of official assistance and private 
capital flows or other export revenues, excluding oil. Therefore, an analysis of the 
effect of oil revenue (even export revenue) on the domestic economy should take into 
consideration the other types of inflows. Unlike Fielding, we try to show that other 
resource flows (and not only export earnings) influence domestic investment, and that 
the volatility of such flows might also be important.
Mbanga and Sikod (2001) aim at showing that debt and debt-service payments 
(resource outflows) are deleterious to investment. Using ordinary least squares, they 
estimate a reduced-form investment function for both public and private investment 
with time series data from 1970 to 1998. They find that debt and debt-service payments 
harm private investment, while the internal debt burden and external debt service 
negatively affect public investment. Ndikumana (2000) finds similar results for 
private investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Our aim in this paper is to see whether these 
resources promote investment when they flow into the country. That is, to establish 
that while outflows harm investment, inflows promote investment. Unlike Mbanga 
and Sikod, we are concerned not only with official flows, but also with private flows 
and export earnings. 14
Modelling domestic private fixed capital 
formation 
T
he difficulties in applying a strict neoclassical investment model in developing   
countries have been outlined in the literature (see for example Blejer and Khan,   
1984; Wai and Wong, 1982). We present here a modified version that draws 
substantially from the works of Stordel (1990), Blejer and Khan (1984), and Wai and 
Wong (1982). The model has been modified to place greater emphasis on the effects of 
resource constraints facing firms in Cameroon and other developing countries. It is built 
around a partial adjustment mechanism that explains capital formation as follows: 
Kt  Kt-1 = It = ât(Kd
t - Kt-1)  (1)
where It is net investment, Kd
t is the desired capital stock, Kt-1 is the capital stock of 
the economy at the beginning of the period t, and ât is an adjustment coefficient that is 
allowed to vary over time. Kd
t and ât are both endogenously determined. The first results 
from the optimization of the capital stock and the second reflects the optimal adjustment 
path leading to the desired capital stock level. ât is assumed to vary systematically with 
economic factors that influence the ability of private investors to achieve the desired 
level of investment. Equation 1 says that change in actual capital stock will respond 
only partially to the difference between desired K and past values of K. In any given 
period a desired level of capital may not be completely realized (as actual capital in 
the next period) because of technical and procedural constraints. 
Also, rigidities in the financial markets may exert a significant influence on the 
process of adjustment to Kd. The low level of development of these markets adds 
importance to the need for external financial resources for investment purposes. Stordel 
(1990) notes that the principal constraint to investment in developing countries is the 
4.  Theoretical framework and 
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quantity of financial resources rather than their costs. We therefore assume that the rate 
of adjustment is constrained not only by the quantity of local bank credit to the private 
sector (CRP), but also by the quantity of resources flowing into the country. These 
resources can be broken down into official flows (OF), foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and other private flows (OPF), and export revenue (XR). The adjustment coefficient 
is then given as: 
ât = f(CRPt, OFt, FDIt, OPFt, XRt,)  (2)
Bank credits are said to be an important source of financing investment for enterprises 
in developing countries in which equity financing is not yet developed. Where financial 
markets are repressed, credit policy affects investment directly through the stock of 
available credit. The positive impact of credit availability on investment has been 
confirmed in many empirical studies (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Wai and Wong, 1982; 
etc.). 
There are a number of channels through which OF affect private investment though 
they are delivered essentially to government. First, OF improve infrastructure, as they 
are very often meant for public capital expenditure. And public investment has been 
shown to crowd in private investment. Second, aid flows can lower the rate of taxation 
as they make up for part of government revenue. Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) 
show that for some developing countries, increased aid precedes (Granger-causes) tax 
reductions. Such reductions lower the tax constraint on private investment. The third 
possible channel through which aid flows can influence private capital formation is 
their effect on government borrowing from the financial sector. Less aid may increase 
public borrowing and consequently crowd out private sector borrowing, especially in a 
system of credit rationing where public liquidity requirements are given priority. Fourth, 
aid conditioned on the level of reform improves the business environment for private 
investment. Dollar and Easterly (1999) show that in a good policy environment, aid 
crowds in private investment. Finally, increased inflows may lead to an appreciation 
of the currency (Dutch disease).6 This has a positive effect on investment as the import 
of capital goods becomes cheaper, especially in developing countries with no capacity 
to produce most of the capital goods required. OF therefore help reduce a number of 
constraints to private investment, thus facilitating adjustment to the desired capital 
stock. 
The channels through which XR affects private capital formation are similar to 
those of OF as both come in the form of additional foreign exchange. Imports are the 
primary source of machinery, equipment and other essential items for investment, and 
export earnings and aid are the principal determinants of the capacity to import. Export 
revenue is an important component of government revenue in Cameroon. Increased 
XR, as was the case with OF, can contribute to improve infrastructure, lower taxes, 
reduce public borrowing and appreciate the currency. The consequence is increased 
private investment through the adjustment coefficient as discussed above. 
As far as private capital flows (PF) are concerned, their impact on domestic 
private capital formation is ambiguous, as noted by Feldstein (1994) and the World 
Bank (2001b). Access to international bank loans will permit local firms to purchase 
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to the international financial market. But the expansion of some firms with access 
to international financial market may push other firms to reduce investment or shut 
down completely. Secondly, PF in the form of FDI, is expected to impact on domestic 
private investment through the spread of best practices, transfer of technology and 
subcontracting to local firms. But increased FDI can also harm domestic investment 
as local firms cannot compete with huge multinational corporations and are forced to 
close down. It is therefore difficult to predict the sign of the effect of PF (both FDI and 
other private flows) on the coefficient of adjustment, and consequently on domestic 
private investment.  
Resource inflows are important for private capital formation, but the manner in 
which these resources are delivered is equally important, and can to a large extent 
determine their effectiveness in influencing investment. It is generally accepted 
in economic literature that the volatility of economic variables affects economic 
performance. We therefore assume that the volatility of the various inflow sources 
has an influence on the process of adjustment of the capital stock to the desired level. 
The coefficient of adjustment is then given as: 
ât = f(CRPt,OFt, FDIt, OPFt, XRt, OFVt, FDIVt, OPFVt, XRVt)  (3)
where OFVt, FDIVt, OPFVt, and XRVt are the volatilities of official flows, FDI, other 
private flows and export revenue, respectively.
Unexpected shortfalls in aid (signs of instability) are likely to be followed by swift 
and possibly inefficient fiscal adjustments. This can lead to a reduction in government 
spending, especially investment expenditures, which are associated with lesser political 
and social risk than recurrent expenditures. The positive influence of government 
investment on private investment is thus reduced. If the government fails to cut 
expenditure, it may increase taxes or borrow from the domestic market. An increase in 
taxes will reduce profit prospects and consequently private capital formation. Moreover, 
government borrowing will crowd out private investors. Therefore, the volatility of 
official flows (OFV) is expected to reduce the speed of adjustment. 
The volatility of private capital flows has a negative effect on investment, the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s being a good example. It is also argued that the volatility 
of private capital flows might be a reflection of underlying economic or political 
uncertainty in the economy, which affects foreign as well as domestic investors. 
As far as export revenue volatility is concerned, it is believed to increase 
uncertainty and reduce business confidence. It leads to income instability, which 
makes estimation of expected returns on investment difficult, generating risks and 
uncertainty for entrepreneurs. On the other hand, XRV can have a positive effect on 
savings (precautionary motives). The higher savings might have a positive influence 
on investment. Secondly, government revenue is often directly linked to export 
revenue implying that instability in the latter will lead to instability in the former 
and thus reduced public investment. And public investment is known to complement 
private investment. Thirdly, it was argued above that export revenue is important for 
import of capital goods. Volatility of export revenue will be transmitted to imports 
and consequently to investment. The effect of XRV on the adjustment coefficient, and 
consequently on domestic private capital formation, cannot be ascertained in advance, 
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In addition to these variables, which stress the resource constraints facing firms in 
Cameroon, other factors are assumed to affect the coefficient of adjustment: Public 
investment, debt overhang, macroeconomic uncertainty and the real exchange rate 
(RER). Public investment (GI) in infrastructure like transport, communication, energy 
and irrigation can complement or crowd in private sector investment. Such projects 
tend to reduce the cost of production and raise the rate of return on private capital, thus 
increasing the speed of adjustment to the desired capital stock. On the other hand, public 
investment that results in large fiscal deficits will raise interest rates. This is expected 
to have a negative impact on the speed of adjustment and subsequently to crowd out 
private capital formation. Cameroon’s huge external debt (DEBT) is expected to have 
a negative effect on the adjustment coefficient, as investors perceive that future taxes 
may have to be increased so as to finance large external transfers to service the debt 
(problem of debt overhang). Such a perception raises uncertainties on future returns 
to investment. 
Apart from the uncertainty created by the volatility of resource inflows, 
macroeconomic uncertainty is also understood to influence private investment. We 
measure macroeconomic uncertainty in this paper with the inflation rate. High and 
unpredictable inflation distorts the information content of relative prices and increases 
the risk of long-term investment. If inflation is anticipated, the cost of capital will rise, 
thus lowering investment. In an empirical study, Greene and Villanueva (1991) found 
that a high inflation rate has a negative impact on investment in a group of developing 
countries. 
The RER plays an ambiguous role as it affects investment through several channels 
that operate in different directions. It affects investment adversely through the cost 
of imports of capital goods and its financial repercussions, and positively through its 
impact on exports. Cameroon imports a larger proportion of its investment goods. An 
over-valued RER will hurt domestic investment as it makes imports more costly. On 
the other hand, it will have a positive impact on export earnings, which are likely to 
increase investment. Unfortunately, we cannot include RER in the private investment 
equation because of insufficient data. 
The coefficient of adjustment is now written as: 
ât = f(CRPt, OFt, FDIt, OPFt, XRt, OFVt, FDIVt, OPFVt, XRVt, GIt, DEBTt, INFt)  (4)
This specification does not include all the determinants of the coefficient of adjustment 
found in the literature. One such variable is the user cost of capital, which is considered 
very important in the neoclassical framework. The user cost of capital is regularly 
measured in the empirical literature by the real interest rate. However, the pervasive role 
of interest rate controls and credit rationing render observed interest rates uninformative 
as to the true marginal cost of funds. A number of studies have failed to find any 
significant relationship between investment and the real interest rate (Jenkins, 1998; 
Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001). We therefore include the quantity of financial resources, 
but not its cost in our investment equation. The cost of labour is also an important 
determinant of the coefficient of adjustment as it influences the cost of production, and 
consequently the profitability of investment. Unfortunately, data limitations preclude 
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Following the accelerator model, the desired stock of capital is assumed to be 





An expected higher output by requiring more inputs will induce a higher desired 
capital stock. 
Combining equations 1, 4 and 5 gives the expression for domestic private capital 
formation (DPI) that will be estimated as follows:
DPIt = f(CRPt,OFt, FDIt, OPFt, XRt, OFVt, FDIVt, OPFVt,  XRVt, 
GIt, DEBTt, INFt, Qe
t)  (6)
Equation 6 constitutes the main model from which a number of variants will be tested. 
Interaction terms will be introduced to see how volatility influences the impact of the 
inflow and other variables on private investment. 
Modelling public capital formation 
G
overnments do not have the same objective of maximizing profits or optimizing   
a desired capital stock as a private firm. Thus the modelling framework   
presented above for private investment does not provide a good motivation 
for public sector investment. The model for public investment that we specify here is 
an adaptation of a framework used by Jenkins7 (1998), which derives from models of 
financial constraints or repression. 
  Public investment will be financially constrained by domestic savings 
and resources flowing into the country: 
GIt = f(St, RFt)   (7)
where GI is public fixed capital formation, S is gross domestic savings and RF is net 
resource flows. Domestic savings are proportional to the amount of credit accorded to 
both the private and the public sectors by the banking system. GI is therefore related 
to the amount of public borrowing from the banking sector (CRG). Because local 
borrowing is not sufficient to cover government deficits, government still has to rely 
on external resource flows. These resources take the form of official flows (OF) and 
export revenue (XR). Such foreign exchange flows are important as they help to cover 
government deficits and help finance government expenditure (including investment). 
Government investment is then specified as follows: 
GIt = f(CRGt, OFt, XRt, )   (8)
Apart from the quantity of resources flowing into a country, the volatility of such 
flows can also be important in determining public investment. Shortfalls in official 
flows (either expected or unexpected) are most likely to be followed by some fiscal 
adjustments, either a reduction in government spending or an increase in taxes or 
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than consumption expenditure. The political and social costs of curtailing consumption 
expenditure may be too high for the government to bear. The volatility of official flows 
(OFV) is therefore more likely to harm public investment. 
Government revenue is often directly linked to export revenue in the form of export 
taxes and royalties from the mining sector of the economy. Export revenue volatility 
(XRV) will likely lead to volatility in government revenue and thus reduced public 
investment. Debt payments by the government reduce the amount of money available 
for government expenditure, including investment expenditure. An increasing debt 
burden is thus expected to have a negative impact on government investment. In the 
same manner, if the government allocates more of its expenditure to consumption, public 
investment will be reduced. Government consumption (GCON) is therefore expected 
to influence government investment negatively. From this, our main model from which 
a number of variants will be estimated can be written as shown in Equation 9:
GIt = f(CRGt, OFt, XRt, OFVt, XRVt, DEBTt, GCONt)   (9)20
Some estimation issues
A 
critical assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) is that there is zero   
correlation between the error term and any explanatory variable. If this is   
violated, the latter is endogenous; OLS estimates will not be consistent and 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques are required. In this study, we use the Hausman   
test to determine if our regressors are endogenous (especially the inflow variables). 
A test is necessary, as Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1997) note that if there is endogeniety, 
OLS will generate inconsistent estimators, while IV will provide both consistent and 
efficient estimators. On the other hand, the use of IV in the absence of endogeniety leads 
to consistent but inefficient estimators, while OLS gives both consistent and efficient 
estimators. Another concern here is that IV estimates tend to be sensitive or not robust 
to the choice of instruments. This reinforces the need for an endogeneity test, as the IV 
method may not be required. Lensink and White (1999), Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
and Dalgaard et al. (2002) test for the endogeneity of aid in growth regressions and 
find that the OLS estimates do not deviate significantly from IV estimates. 
In order to carry out the Hausman specification test,8 we run two OLS regressions. 
Let us assume that we are estimating an investment function, and one of the regressors  X  
is suspected to be endogenous. In the first regression, we regress the suspect variable on 
the remaining regressors and instruments (the reduced form) and retrieve the residuals. 
Then in the second regression, we estimate the investment equation including the 
residuals from the first regression as an additional regressor. If the coefficient on the 
residual regressor is not significantly different from zero, then X, the suspect variable 
is not endogenous. OLS estimates will be consistent. Otherwise, we will use IV. The 
“fitted” values of aid (from the reduced form equation) will then replace X in the 
investment equation. Fitted X is not correlated with the disturbance term. IV should 
now provide consistent and efficient estimators.  
We avoid spurious regression that might result from running regressions with non-
stationary variables by first studying the time series characteristics of all the variables. A 
5.  Estimation issues, data sources 
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spurious regression will indicate a statistically significant relationship between variables 
in the model, when in fact this is just evidence of contemporaneous correlation. The 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test will be used for this investigation.
If the unit root test reveals that our variables are non-stationary, we will test for 
cointegration. In a regression involving non-stationary variables, spuriousness can 
only be avoided if a cointegrating relationship is established between the variables. 
Therefore, if two or more variables can be linked together to form an equilibrium 
relationship spanning the long run, then even though the variables themselves may 
contain stochastic trends they will nevertheless move closer over time and the difference 
between them will be stable. To test for cointegration, we run our regressions and 
apply the ADF test to the residuals. If the residuals are stationary, then we conclude 
for cointegration of variables used in the model. 
To test the possibility of various inflow volatilities offsetting (counteracting) or 
complementing each other, we calculate their correlation coefficients. A negative 
correlation coefficient will imply that inflows counteract each other and consequently 
reduce the negative impact on investment. A positive coefficient, on the contrary, 
implies that inflows move together, reinforcing shortfalls and windfalls. The importance 
of the correlations will be judged by the significance of the correlation coefficients 
at the conventional levels (1, 5 and 10%). Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) use 
the correlation coefficient for a similar analysis, while Collier (1999) prefers the 
covariance. 
We probe further into the interrelationship between the various inflows by examining 
whether the effectiveness of an inflow in influencing investment is affected by the 
volatility of the other inflows. We use interaction terms for this purpose. 
Data sources and definition of variables
T
he main data source for this study is the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO)   
database. This has provided data for GDP, gross fixed capital formation (both   
public and private), foreign direct investment, export revenue and the debt 
stock. We subtracted FDI from net private capital flows to get our series for other 
private capital flows. Data on net credit9 to government and the private sector were 
obtained from World Bank sources. Data on net official flows (ODF) came online 
from the website of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD). We use annual data from 
1970 to 2000 for this study.
For the measurement of volatility, Gyimah-Brempong (1991) notes that there is no 
general agreement on the method of measurement. Some authors use more than one 
method of measurement so that their results are not dependent on any one volatility 
index. A number of ways of measuring volatility are found in the literature: Stordel 
(1990) proposes the use of a three-year moving average of the coefficient of variation. 
Dawe (1996) and Sinha (1999) use the absolute value of the deviations from a five-
year moving average. Ghirmay et al. (1999) prefer the squared deviation from the 
exponential trend. Serven (1998) uses the generalized autoregressive conditional 
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autoregressive equation, and obtain volatility as the standard deviation of the residuals. 
We use two volatility measures in this study so that our results are not dependent on 
one index. 
The first volatility index of interest is that used by Lensink and Morrissey (2001). 
It is obtained by first estimating the following autoregressive equation: 
yt = á0 + á1T + á2yt-1 + á3yt-2 + á4yt-3 + et   (10)
where yt is the variable of interest, T the trend, and et the error term. We use only two 
lags because of the smallness of our sample. The equation is estimated by OLS, and 
volatility is obtained as the standard deviation of residuals: 
Volatility I: Vyt = STDEV(êt)  (11)
where Vyt is the volatility of yt.
The next volatility measure we use is given as a three-year moving standard 
deviation of the variable of interest, given as:
Volatility II: Vyt = STDEV(yt-1, yt, yt+1)   (12)
Many studies on the effectiveness of aid in developing countries have used the 
conventional concept of official development assistance (ODA). ODA, as defined by 
the DAC/OECD, includes only concessional inflows, which convey a grant element 
of at least 25%. This definition fails to include non-concessional flows: Regular loans 
from the World Bank and the African Development Bank and the standby agreements 
and extended facility loans of the IMF. Our definition of aid in this paper is what the 
OECD/OECD refers to as official development financing (ODF),10 defined as the sum of 
the recipient’s receipt of bilateral ODA, grants, and concessional and non-concessional 
development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and other official flows for 
development purposes that have too low a grant element to qualify as ODA. From this 
definition, ODF certainly includes overdrafts from the French treasury (for Cameroon 
and other CFA Zone countries). What is of interest to us is the total amount of official 
resource flows to the country, rather than their concessional or non-concessional nature. 
Therefore, aid or official flows in this paper mean ODF. 
Since expected output (Qe
t) is not observable, it has to be generated. We use the 
general distributed lag method in which expected output is a function of its past values 
as follows: 
Qe
t = g0 + ågtlogQt-1,   t = [1, . . . n].  (13)
Given that our sample size is small, we use only the first three lags. Output is measured 
by real GDP. 
Gross fixed capital formation is given as public and private. To obtain gross private 
domestic fixed capital formation, we subtracted FDI from total gross private fixed 
capital formation. Resource flows are given as net values: Net official flows and net 
private flows. All the variables are measured as ratios of GDP. 23 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
Volatility of resource inflows
V
olatility indexes for aggregate inflow and its various components are presented 
in Table 2. The two parts of the table present the two methods of measuring  
volatility. The volatilities, given for each of the subperiods identified above, 
are obtained as the simple arithmetic mean of the volatility index for the given period. 
Considering the whole study period (19702000), export revenue was the most volatile 
of the inflows, followed by “other private flows”, and official flows. FDI is the least 
volatile of all the inflow components, a result that is consistent no matter the method 
of calculating volatility. 
Concerning the economic phases, the most volatile period as indicated by aggregate 
inflow volatility was the post-devaluation era (19942000). It was also consistently 
the period with the highest volatility of official inflows. Official flows were equally 
highly volatile during the crisis period (1987 to 1993). These two subperiods were 
characterized by the adoption of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) and 
the tying of aid flows to the implementation of reforms (conditionalities). Much of 
the committed aid was delayed or not disbursed at all because of interruptions in the 
reform programme or backtracking. Aid delivery was consequently more volatile 
during this period. The 19701977 era is also robustly indicated as the period during 
which “other private flows” was most volatile. The other results are not robust to the 
method of measuring volatility. 
Table 2 shows only the extent to which the various inflow components are volatile; 
it does not indicate the contribution of each inflow volatility to aggregate or total 
resource inflow volatility. To do this, we need to weight the volatilities with the various 
inflow levels. The importance of inflow volatility depends on the contribution of that 
inflow to total resource flows. An inflow might be very volatile, but if its share in total 
resource flows is insignificant it will contribute very little to aggregate volatility. Table 
3 presents the weighted averages of the inflow volatilities. 
6.  Empirical results24
The table shows that most of the volatility of aggregate resource flows is attributed 
to export revenue. Export revenue alone contributes more than 60% of all volatility 
(Volatility I). 
This is not surprising, as export revenue has already been shown to be the most volatile 
of all the resource flows, and more especially made up more than 75% of resource flows 
to Cameroon. Net official flow volatility is the next most important cause of aggregate 
volatility. It contributes more to aggregate volatility than “other private flows” despite 
being less volatile, because the level of official flows was more important than those 
of other private flows. FDI remains the least volatile and the smallest contributor 
to aggregate inflow volatility. The figures in the table for the two volatility indexes 
are different, but lead to the same conclusion about the contribution of the different 
inflow components to total inflow volatility. Export is the most important and FDI is 
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Correlation of components of inflow volatility 
T
he objective of calculating the correlation coefficient between the volatilities of   
the different inflows is to examine their co-movement, i.e., to see whether they   
counteract (offset) or reinforce (complement) each other. Table 4 presents the 
simple correlation coefficients and their t-ratios in parentheses. A comparison of the 
t-ratios and the critical values shows no significant co-movement between any of 
the components of inflow volatility at the conventional levels (1, 5 and 10%). Most 
of the t-ratios are in fact less than unity in absolute terms, implying that most of the 
inflow volatilities are completely independent of each other  neither complementing 
nor counteracting each other. This is good news in that the volatility of one inflow 
component is not reinforced by that of the other inflow. It is equally not very good 
news as the volatility of an inflow component cannot be offset by the volatility of the 
other components. There is therefore no relationship between the movements of the 
volatilities of the various inflow components. We will investigate (through the use of 
interactive variables) whether the inflow levels can reduce or eliminate the harmful 
effect of the volatility of some inflow components on domestic private investment 
and public investment. 
Unit root tests
W
e carry out the unit root test using the ADF test (Table A2 in the Appendix).   
Most of the variables have a unit root  I(1). The test results are not robust   
to the methods of computing volatility. Some of the inflow volatilities 
are I(0) under one method and I(1) under the other. We cannot therefore estimate 
the equations with the variables in their levels without the risk of obtaining spurious 
regressions except if they are cointegrated. To carry out the cointegration test, we run 
the regressions and test the residuals for unit roots. If the residuals are stationary, we 
conclude for the cointegrations of the variables in the regression. We still use the ADF 
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Hausman test for endogeneity of regressors 
A
s described above, we carry out a Hausman specification test to see if total   
resource flows and its various components are endogenous. One of the major   
problems in this exercise is the choice of instruments. The search for instruments 
becomes more arduous when dealing with single-country time-series studies, as is our 
case here. For this study, we have used as instruments the first three lags of the variables 
concerned. These are used as instruments by (among others) Dalgaard et al. (2002) 
and Hansen and Tarp (1999). The smallness of our sample explains the use of only the 
first three lags. Table 5 indicates that the instruments used are valid for all the variables 
instrumented, as all the F-statistics are significantly different from zero. 
The results of the endogeneity tests presented in Table 6 show only the results of the
residual regressors (coefficient and t-ratio). It is the significance of the residual regressor 
that determines whether the variable in question is endogenous. From the table, the 
residuals are all non-significant. Total resource flows and export revenue show some 
degree of endogeneity (reading the size of the t-statistic), but are not significant using 
the conventional confidence levels. All the inflow components are consequently treated 
in our regressions as non-endogenous (all the equations are estimated using OLS).
Regression results for private domestic fixed 
capital formation
H
ere we present the results of our regression analysis on the relationship between   
gross fixed private domestic capital formation and resource inflows and their   
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for its various components, as the literature holds that the effect of resource inflows 
on domestic investment is different depending on the type of inflow. 
Table 7 presents the results for aggregate resource flows. As expected, the results 
show a strong positive relationship between total resource flows and private domestic 
capital formation. Total resource flows therefore supplement domestic savings and help 
spur private capital formation. The volatility of total resource flows has a negative and 
significant effect on private capital formation as hypothesized. When we interact total 
resource flows with the volatility of its different components, only export volatility 
and official flow volatility are significant and carry the expected sign. The volatility 
of the private flows does not seem to influence the impact of total flows on private 
fixed capital formation. Increased volatility of export revenue and official flows will 
therefore eliminate the positive effect of total flows on private domestic investment. 
Credit to the private sector and expected output also have a positive significant 
influence on capital formation. The debt overhang, as expected, hurts capital formation. 
Government investment is not significant, and even carries a negative sign in all the 
regressions. Our proxy for macro instability (the rate of inflation) is not significant 
and has an unstable sign. The overall performance of the regression is good, as more 
than 65% (adjusted R-squared) of changes in private domestic capital formation are 
explained by the variables included. The variables are cointegrated and the test for the 
overall validity of the model (F-statistic) is significant at the 1% level. Vo l a t i l i t y o f  Re s o u R c e  in f l o w s  a n d  do m e s t i c in V e s t m e n t  in ca m e R o o n   28
We now examine separately the effects of the various inflow components and their 
volatilities on private domestic capital formation in Cameroon. The results for exports 
revenue very much mimic those of total resource flows (Table 8). It should be recalled 
that export revenue constitutes the bulk of total inflows, and equally contributes to 
most of the aggregate inflow volatility. While export revenue strongly and positively 
influences private capital formation, its volatility has a significant negative impact. 
When export revenue is interacted with the volatility of the other inflows, only the 
volatility of official flows has a negative and significant coefficient. The volatility of the 
private flows has no influence. Therefore, while export revenue promotes investment, 
its volatility constitutes a significant income risk to investors as it makes estimation 
of expected returns on investment difficult, and thus reduces investment. It might also 
affect the import of capital goods for investment. 29 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
Export revenue volatility can actually result from three sources: Fluctuations in 
export prices, export quantities and the exchange rate. Exporters in Cameroon have no 
influence on export prices (determined by international market conditions) or on the 
exchange rate (Cameroon belongs to a monetary union and cannot unilaterally change 
the exchange rate). They can only determine the quantity exported. Their influence 
on revenue volatility is thus very limited. A likely strategy should be to diversify to 
many export commodities. With a broad export base, there is a possibility that the 
volatilities of some of the numerous export prices can counteract or offset each other, 
thus reducing revenue volatility. Credit to the private sector, debt overhang, government 
capital formation (negative and insignificant) and inflation maintain the results obtained 
above for total resource flows. Expected output has a significant coefficient in only one 
of the three equations estimated. The diagnostic tests, as above, confirm the validity 
of the model and the variables used are cointegrated.
The results of the influence of official flows on private domestic capital formation are 
presented in Table 9. Against our expectations, official flows have a negative, though 
not significant, effect on private domestic investment. Official flows are normally 
expected to lead to lower taxes, improve infrastructure, reduce government borrowing, 
induce reforms and consequently encourage private investment. Their effect on private 
investment is indirect, however, as they are delivered to government and not private 
investors. Since official flows are largely used to finance government investment, 
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coefficient of official flows. This failed even to change the sign of the coefficient, 
which remains negative in all the equations estimated. Dollar and Easterly (1999: 571) 
found a negative coefficient when they regressed private investment on the aid/GDP 
ratio. Their coefficient became positive and significant when the aid/GDP ratio was 
interacted with an economic policy index. The implication was that aid would have a 
significant impact in a good policy environment. 
Perhaps a further disaggregation of official flows into bilateral/multilateral and 
concessional/non-concessional might help unravel the relationship between official 
flows and domestic private investment, but this requires further investigation into 
the impact of the various categories of official flows. The volatility of official flows 
produced the expected negative and significant coefficient. When we interact official 
inflows with the volatilities of the other inflows, only the volatility of export revenue 
influences the relationship between official flows and private capital formation. 
The volatilities of the private flows are not important. As for the other determinants 
of private domestic capital formation, credit to the private sector remains a strong 
determinant. The negative effect of debt burden also continues to be significant. At 
least 50% (adjusted R-squared) of all variation in private capital formation is explained 
in all the regressions. 
Another unexpected result comes from the relationship between FDI and private 
domestic capital formation (Table 10). Theory predicts that FDI will spill over to 
domestic firms in the form of best management practices, transfer of technology and 
even subcontracting. The FDI coefficient is negative, however, though not significant. 31 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
This result seems to be validating the hypothesis that FDI from huge multinational 
firms might force local firms to close down. Some authors refer to this as the “market 
stealing” effect  that is  foreign firms acquire market share at the expense of domestic 
firms and force them to shut down. FDI volatility has the expected negative sign, 
but is not significant. The interaction of FDI with the volatilities of the other inflows 
produces only one significant coefficient. Official flow volatility reinforces the negative 
relationship between FDI and domestic capital formation. Credit to the private sector 
and debt overhang remain robust as with the previous inflows. Public investment, 
inflation and expected output equally stay insignificant. The ADF test is significant for 
all the regressions. The explanatory power of the model is low and even falls below 
50% (adjusted R-squared) for one of the regressions. 
Table 11 presents the results of the relationship between private domestic capital 
formation and “other private capital flows”. This variable has a positive and significant 
impact on private capital formation. Other private capital flows are made up essentially 
of international bank loans and less of portfolio flows because of the non-existence of a 
stock exchange in the country at the time. Despite being relatively high, the volatility of 
this variable is not significant in the regression results. Even though it has the expected 
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on private capital formation. When other private capital flows are interacted with the 
volatilities of the other inflows, only official flows carry a significant coefficient. Credit 
to the private sector and debt overhang have a significant relationship with private 
capital as usual. Government capital formation, inflation and expected output are not 
significant. At least 51% of the variation of private capital formation is explained by 
the few variables included. The variables are equally cointegrated. 
To summarize, an examination of the separate effects of the various inflow components 
on private domestic capital formation has been useful, as the various inflows do not 
affect private investment in the same way. Total resource flows significantly influence 
private domestic investment. When this is disaggregated, export revenue and “other 
private capital flows” have a significant impact on private domestic capital formation, 
but official flows and FDI do not. They even carry negative (though insignificant) 
coefficients. The volatilities of all the inflow components negatively affect private 
capital formation, except FDI volatility, which is not significant, but then we established 
earlier that FDI was the least volatile of all the inflows. When we interact the levels 
of inflows with the volatilities of the other inflows, it comes out that official flow 
volatility and export revenue volatility not only hurt private investment directly, they 
also affect the way total flows and other inflow components influence investment. 
Official inflow volatility significantly influences the behaviour of total resource flows, 
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effect on total flows and official flows. A reduction in these volatilities will therefore 
have a direct positive effect on private investment, and will also increase the impact 
of the other inflows on investment. 
The results of the other investment determinants are mixed. Credit to the private 
sector consistently and significantly influences private investment in Cameroon. This 
is a confirmation of the results of Ndikumana (2000) and Fielding (1995). Similarly, 
debt overhang is significantly harmful to private investment (a corroboration of 
results obtained by Mbanga and Sikod, 2001). Expected output is not consistent as it 
is significant only when the inflows are aggregated. Public investment and the rate of 
inflation appear consistently not related with private domestic investment. The overall 
performance of the private domestic investment model is satisfactory. At least 50% of 
the variation in private investment is explained by the independent variables included 
in the model. The only exception is with FDI, where the adjusted R-squared is below 
50%. The ADF test shows that all the variables included in the model are cointegrated. 
The F-statistic is significant for all the regressions in the model. 
Regression results for public fixed capital 
formation 
F
or public fixed capital formation, we first examine the effect of total resource   
flows, before disaggregating this into official flows and export revenue. In addition   
to the resource flow variables, we examine the influence of banking sector 
credit to government, the debt burden and government consumption on public capital 
formation in Cameroon. Total resource flows have a positive and significant impact 
on government investment (Table 12). This was expected, as these flows provide the 
government with financial resources to carry out its investment projects. The volatility 
of these flows has a negative and significant effect on public capital formation. This was 
equally expected, as shortfalls in anticipated inflows can lead to abrupt and inefficient 
fiscal adjustments that will likely hurt public investment. In Cameroon, this effect is 
manifest in government projects that are uncompleted and abandoned because of lack 
of financial resources. 
When total resource flows are interacted with the volatilities of official flows and 
export flows, we obtain negative and significant coefficients. These volatilities therefore 
counteract the positive influence of total resource flows on public investment. Credit 
by the banking sector to the government has no significant effect on government 
investment, but has the right sign. As expected, government consumption significantly 
hurts government investment. Public resources are used more for consumption than 
for investment. The debt burden has the expected negative and significant influence 
on public investment, a logical result since debt repayments deprive the government 
of resources for investment requirements. The explanatory power of these regressions 
is low, with only 32% (adjusted R-squared) of the changes of the dependent variable 
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Table 13 shows that the export revenue component of resource flows has a positive 
and significant effect on public capital formation. The volatility of export revenue has 
a negative and significant effect on government investment. Highly volatile exports 
might push the government to make swift and costly fiscal changes that harm public 
investment. An interaction of export revenue with official flow volatility produces 
a negative and significant coefficient. Volatile official flows will therefore affect 
the way export revenue promotes public investment. As with total resource flows, 
government credit is not significantly important. The debt burden and government 
consumption significantly hamper government investment activities. The measurement 
for the goodness of fit (adjusted R-squared) shows that less than 30% of the change in 
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Results of the influence of official flows on government investment in Cameroon are 
summarized in Table 14. They show a positive and significant influence of official 
flows on public capital formation. As with export revenue, official inflows provide 
the government with financial resources to carry out its investment projects. Official 
flow volatility is detrimental to public investment. The interaction of official flows 
with export volatility negatively affects public investment. Export volatility therefore 
dampens the effect of official flows on public capital formation. As shown in Table 
14, external debt and government consumption remain negative and significant, while 
credit to the public has no significant effect on government investment. The diagnostic 
tests mimic those in Table 14. The adjusted R-squared continues to be very small for 
the public investment regressions.
 
To summarize, the results show that total resource flows and both its components 
(export revenue and official flows) positively and significantly influence public capital 
formation. They provide the government with the financial resources necessary to carry 
out its investment projects. The volatility of these resources consistently hurts public 
investment. What is more disturbing is that both export and official flow volatilities 
not only affect public investment, but actually negate the influence of official flows 
and export revenue, respectively, on public investment. There is therefore a possibility 
that volatility might actually make resource flows to have a detrimental effect on public 
investment. For example, aid promises can actually make the government initiate 
more projects than would have been the case without such pledges. Failure or delays 
in delivery can compromise the realization of such projects and even the abandonment 
of those begun. 
Credit to the government consistently has no significant relationship with public 
investment. Such credits might have been used essentially for government consumption, 
while relying on external aid for investment. Aid generally targets investment, and not 
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This raises the issue of aid fungibility. If donors restrict the use of aid funds on 
investment projects only, the government can cancel own-financed investment projects 
and borrow from the banking sector to finance its consumption. This provides an 
explanation for the significant and negative impact of government consumption on 
public investment. The Debt burden equally appears as a significant deterrent to public 
investment. This corroborates the results of Mbanga and Sikod (2001). Debt payments 
deprive the government of investment resources. The public investment model does not 
perform very well in terms of goodness of fit. In some of the regressions, the regressors 
included explain less than 25% of the changes in the dependent variable. This is however 
not very worrying as our objective was not to identify the determinants of public 
investment, but to examine the influence of resource flows and their volatility. The 
F-statistic is significant for all the regressions. The ADF test applied to the regression 
residuals reveals that all the variables included are cointegrated. 37 R e s e a R c h  Pa P e R  221
7.  Summary and policy implications
O
ur main objective in this paper was to examine the effect of resource inflows   
and inflow volatility on domestic (both public and private) capital formation in   
Cameroon. This objective is set in the context of declining and volatile resource 
inflows, and also declining capital formation. The importance of capital formation to 
growth and poverty reduction is well documented in the literature. 
The results indicate that resource flows to Cameroon are very volatile compared to 
the average for developing countries. The most volatile of the resource flows is export 
revenue, followed by other private flows, official flows and then FDI, in that order. 
The most volatile period among the four identified in the study is the post-devaluation 
period. These results are relevant to the method of computing the volatility index. The 
volatility of official flows is to a large extent responsible for the high aggregate volatility 
of this period. In order to assess the contribution of each inflow volatility to aggregate 
volatility, the volatilities are weighted by the inflow levels. Export revenue comes out 
as the prime mover of aggregate resource flow volatility, followed by official flows, 
other private flows and FDI in that order. A simple correlation analysis of the inflow 
volatilities shows no evidence of significant correlation between the volatilities. This 
implies that they can neither reinforce nor counteract each other. 
In our regression analysis, we examine the influence of resource flows and volatility 
on both private domestic capital formation and public capital formation. First, 
concerning private domestic capital formation, total resource flows are very important. 
When this is disaggregated, only export revenue and other private flows significantly 
influence private domestic investment. Official flows and FDI show no significant 
relationship with private domestic investment. Aggregate inflow volatility significantly 
undermines private domestic investment, a result mirrored by the volatilities of export 
revenue, official flows and other private flows. FDI volatility is not significant. 
An interaction of resource flows with volatilities shows that official flow volatility 
dampens the effectiveness of total resource flows, export revenue, FDI and “other 
private flows” in promoting private investment. Export revenue volatility has a similar 
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determinants included in the model, credit to the private sector promotes private 
investment, while debt overhang is deleterious to private investment. Public investment 
and expected output do not appear important. 
Concerning public investment, total resource flow is important. Its disaggregated 
components (export revenue and official flows) are also effective in promoting public 
capital formation. Aggregate volatility and the volatilities of export revenue and official 
flows are all detrimental to public capital formation. Official flow volatility reverses the 
positive influence of aggregate flows and export revenue on public capital formation. 
In the same way, export volatility overturns the effect of aggregate flows and official 
flows on public investment. Government consumption and the debt burden both have 
detrimental effects on public capital formation. 
A number of policy suggestions come out of this study, with the aim of making 
resource flows more effective for promoting both public and private capital formation. 
There is need to raise exports, as export revenue is very important for both public 
and private investment. In order to reduce export volatility, the export base should be 
diversified so as to reduce over-reliance on a few primary commodities (like cocoa, 
coffee and rubber), especially as oil is becoming less important in export revenue. 
Attempts should be made to export more manufactured goods, especially to the central 
African subregion. Diversification is recommended as a remedy to export revenue 
volatility since Cameroon can neither change the export price nor the exchange rate 
(other causes of export revenue volatility).
Official flows can be made to have a significant effect on private investment by 
improving the policy environment. This follows from recent literature emphasizing the 
importance of policy for aid effectiveness. Government adherence to the conditions 
regularly attached to official flows can reduce their volatility. Donors are also called 
upon to reduce the extent of conditionality as recommended by the Paris Declaration 
(Paris High-Level Forum, 2005), as this undermines government policy and makes aid 
more volatile. This should make aid deliveries more predictable from aid commitments, 
and prevent recurrent suspensions and cancellations of aid promises. Coordination 
between the main bilateral and multilateral donors in the sequencing of aid deliveries 
can also reduce volatility. The advent of the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) 
can be quite helpful. The ownership dimension of the PRSP means that compliance 
with conditionality should not be a major problem since Cameroon was actually at 
the origin of the strategy, with the strong backing of donors. Other donors (especially 
bilateral) should be brought on board to enhance the coordination of aid delivery. 
The attraction of more private flows into the country (especially the “other private 
flows”) should promote domestic private investment. A well functioning and transparent 
stock exchange and a liberalized financial sector can be very helpful in this direction. 
To stem the volatility of private capital flows, government should avoid frequent 
and unanticipated policy changes, since foreign investors view them as symptoms of 
domestic policy deficiencies. 39
1 It is indeed difficult to compare these indexes. First, aid is not measured in the same way   
Collier uses aid per capita, while we use both concessional and non-concessional official flows 
as a ratio of GDP. Gemmel and McGillivray also use this approach, but do not scale it with the 
GDP. Second, while Collier measures volatility as the coefficient of variation (CV) of aid per 
capita, Gemmel and McGillivray compute it as the CV of the first difference of aid. We use 
two other methods as described below. Third, the period during which volatility is measured 
is also important, and these studies do not cover the same period. 
2 Investment refers to gross fixed capital formation. 
3 There is a possibility that the revenue from the oil boom led to some “spurious growth” 
of the GDP. This can happen when higher government revenues are used to finance higher 
expenditure in the form of higher wages to civil servants (leading to higher wages), when in 
fact their productivity has not changed or is even declining. 
4 The international price of crude oil fell by two-thirds between 1986 and 1988, while the 
prices of coffee and cocoa fell by one-half and one-third, respectively. Terms of trade declined 
consequently by nearly 40% (Ghura, 1997). 
5 The spike in 1994 (13.57%) of net official flows is partly attributable to the 1994 
devaluation. 
6 It is also worth noting that subsequent spending of aid on imports can make the currency   
move in the opposite direction. 
7 Jenkins (1998) used the framework to model private and not public investment. 
8 This modified Hausman specification test is suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1997: 
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4) and in EViews help menu.
9 The ideal situation would have been to use only medium- and long-term credit as a determinant 
of investment. We could not lay hands on such data. 
10 The definition of ODF is taken from the “Glossary of Terms and Concepts” from the OECD 
website. http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html
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